Towards A Cross-Domain MapReduce Framework by Nguyen, Thuy D. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2013
Towards A Cross-Domain MapReduce Framework
Nguyen, Thuy D.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43379
 Towards A Cross-Domain MapReduce Framework 
Thuy D. Nguyen, Mark A. Gondree, Jean Khosalim, Cynthia E. Irvine 
Department of Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
{tdnguyen, mgondree, jkhosali, irvine}@nps.edu 
 
Abstract—The Apache™ Hadoop® framework provides parallel 
processing and distributed data storage capabilities that data 
analytics applications can utilize to process massive sets of raw 
data. These Big Data applications typically run as a set of 
MapReduce jobs to take advantage of Hadoop’s ease of service 
deployment and large-scale parallelism. Yet, Hadoop has not 
been adapted for multilevel secure (MLS) environments where 
data of different security classifications co-exist.  
To solve this problem, we have used the Security Enhanced Linux 
(SELinux) Linux kernel extension in a prototype cross-domain 
Hadoop on which multiple instances of Hadoop applications run 
at different sensitivity levels. Their accesses to Hadoop resources 
are constrained by the underlying MLS policy enforcement 
mechanism. A benefit of our prototype is its extension of the 
Hadoop Distributed File System to provide a cross-domain read-
down capability for Hadoop applications without requiring 
complex Hadoop server components to be trustworthy.  
Keywords: MapReduce, Hadoop, cross-domain services, 
multilevel security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) and US Intelligence 
Community (IC) recognize they have a Big Data 
problem. High volumes of streaming data are ingested from the 
tactical edge, originating from a variety of sensors  [1]. The 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency anticipates collecting 
on the order of four petabytes, annually [2]. Mission analytics 
may further require archival data to compare with current 
intelligence data.  
Agencies are embracing a data-centric model that 
empowers analysts to query data anywhere in the cloud, based 
on need-to-know. The IC envisions an agile, shared cloud 
architecture, following this paradigm [3]. The NSA reportedly 
operates three private clouds, already: a utility cloud, a storage 
cloud and a data cloud; the latter uses versions of Hadoop and 
MapReduce to manage intelligence analytics [4]. The Naval 
Tactical Cloud (NTC) employs distributed cloud-based data 
services to provide timely access to mission-relevant 
intelligence and operational data under advanced Anti-
Access/Area Denial conditions. The NTC architecture 
leverages an open-source software stack featuring HDFS, 
Hadoop MapReduce, ZooKeeper and Accumulo [5]. 
The ability of these products to appropriately handle data of 
multiple classifications is dubious. Researchers have already 
discovered commercial cloud products where information 
flows violating the isolation requirements for multi-tenancy 
both leaked cryptographic keys and exposed private data [6][7]. 
The prototype described here is part of our larger 
investigation into security issues for cloud computing with Big 
Data from sources of different sensitivities. We describe our 
initial experiments using a modified MapReduce platform to 
perform Big Data analytics across security domains in an MLS 
environment, leveraging a novel architecture supported by an 
underlying secure platform. This MLS-aware cross-domain 
Hadoop (CD-Hadoop) prototype is implemented using Security 
Enhanced Linux1 (SELinux) [8] configured to enforce MLS 
policy following the Bell-LaPadula confidentiality policy 
model [9]. SELinux mediates access to information of different 
sensitivity levels based on hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
security labels of the subjects and objects; Hadoop itself is not 
involved in MLS policy enforcement. The problem of 
inadvertent contamination of low information by inept or 
malicious users is beyond the scope of this work. 
The remaining sections describe Hadoop [10], the concept 
of operations, the system architecture, and the implementation 
of a CD-Hadoop prototype. We conclude by discussing 
performance tests used to evaluate the overhead incurred while 
processing read-down operations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Apache Hadoop is an open-source implementation that is 
based on the Google File System [11] and the MapReduce 
parallel computational model developed by Google [12]. The 
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) consists 2  of three 
components: the NameNode, Secondary NameNode and 
DataNode. Two components comprise the Hadoop MapReduce 
engine: the JobTracker and the TaskTracker. In a Hadoop 
cluster, there are one NameNode, one Secondary NameNode, 
one JobTracker, and multiple DataNodes and TaskTrackers. 
To run a MapReduce job, the client first copies the job’s 
input data, configuration file and Map and Reduce functions 
onto the Hadoop file system as HDFS files. Each file is divided 
into multiple HDFS blocks, stored on the DataNodes. The 
client then submits the job to the JobTracker, which creates a 
set of Map and Reduce tasks for the job. The JobTracker 
delegates these tasks to different TaskTrackers and monitors 
the progress of all jobs. Each TaskTracker executes the tasks 
assigned to it by the JobTracker and regularly informs the 
JobTracker about the status of all outstanding tasks and when it 
is ready to run a new task. Next, we describe the NameNode 
                                                 
1 In particular, Fedora 13 with Security Enhanced Linux enabled was used. 
2 Description reflects Hadoop v0.20.2, used in our prototype. 
The views expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
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and DataNode components in more detail, as our design 
significantly impacts those components.  
A. NameNode 
A NameNode is a daemon that manages the HDFS file 
system namespace and coordinates file access requests from 
clients. An HDFS file consists of blocks that are replicated and 
stored on different DataNodes. The block size and replication 
factor are configurable; defaults are 64MB and 1x, 
respectively. The NameNode decides where the blocks are to 
be replicated and informs the corresponding DataNode of its 
selection.  
The primary HDFS namespace data structure (fsImage) 
contains the metadata associated with individual files, e.g., file 
properties and the locations where each block and its replicas 
are stored. The NameNode also uses a transaction log (edits) to 
keep track of changes to the HDFS metadata. Both data 
structures are stored as files in the NameNode’s local file 
system. During start-up, the NameNode reads both files, 
creates a new fsImage file in volatile memory, applies the 
changes indicated by the edits log, clears edits, and persists 
both back to disk. During runtime, whenever the edits structure 
is updated, it is flushed to disk. 
B. DataNode 
A DataNode is a daemon that provides the block storage 
functionality for the cluster. The DataNode stores blocks as 
files in its local file system. After getting information about the 
blocks associated with a particular HDFS file from the 
NameNode, a client sends data requests to the DataNodes that 
are directly responsible for those particular blocks. The 
DataNode sends periodic messages to the NameNode, 
informing it of its status.  
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Hadoop enforces an application-level discretionary access 
control policy using permission bits similar to UNIX file access 
controls. Hadoop also maintains user sessions based on the user 
login IDs. However, with respect to mandatory access control, 
Hadoop lacks the ability for an authenticated user to negotiate a 
session at a specific sensitivity level, which would be used to 
determine the resources that user can access under MLS policy. 
In our CD-Hadoop prototype, the user session level is 
implicitly established by the sensitivity level of the network 
interface and TCP/IP port from which the request is received.  
The Hadoop file system is structured as a hierarchical tree 
of directories and files, with an interface similar to the 
traditional UNIX file system. In a traditional Hadoop cluster, 
there is only one file system and its root is at “/”. In our MLS-
enhanced cluster, there are multiple file systems, one per 
sensitivity level.  
Each of these file systems is managed by an HDFS instance 
that runs at that level. The root directory of a file system at a 
particular level is expressed as /<level> (e.g., /unclass, 
/sec-level0). The <level> value is a user-defined string 
that is administratively associated with one SELinux sensitivity 
level. To be backward compatible with existing applications, 
the CD-Hadoop prototype treats the traditional root directory 
(/) as the file system root at the user’s session level. For 
example, a client running at SECRET can access files stored 
under the SECRET root directory as either 
/secret/<filename> or, simply, as /<filename>. 
A user can access HDFS file objects using tools provided 
with the Hadoop distribution (e.g., FS Shell) and with HDFS-
aware applications that use the HDFS API. A user can read and 
write file objects at their session level, but can only read file 
objects at lower levels, i.e., the user can read any objects whose 
level is dominated by their session level. Writes are only 
permissible at the user’s current session level. 
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
Software is considered MLS-aware if it executes without 
privileges in an MLS environment, and yet takes advantage of 
that environment to provide useful functionality [13]. For 
example, on a system enforcing a mandatory security policy as 
modeled by Bell and LaPadula, when an application executes 
at a particular sensitivity level, it can read from resources 
labeled at the same or lower levels but can only write to 
resources labeled at the same level or higher. If the application 
is modified to reflect the underlying mandatory policy—e.g., to 
return the level of the data or make decisions based on the level 
of the data—we say that the application is MLS-aware. 
The Hadoop code base is large and very complex. Thus, it 
is prudent to minimize the code changes required to make 
Hadoop MLS-aware. The Hadoop MapReduce engine enables 
parallel data processing while HDFS provides distributed data 
storage. Although the MapReduce server processes keep their 
internal data structures on the local file system, the data used 
by the Map and Reduce application tasks are kept in the HDFS. 
Hence, this project focuses on making HDFS MLS-aware, a 
step towards a secure Hadoop platform suitable for use in MLS 
environments. In our proof-of-concept design, HDFS server 
processes running at their particular sensitivity levels are 
cognizant of the file system namespaces at lower security 
levels and can access those file objects as the system’s security 
policy permits. To use this design with real data, each physical 
node in the Hadoop cluster must be hosted on a trusted 
platform that mediates the node’s access to the local file system 
(where local files are labeled) according to an MLS policy.  
Before discussing our implementation of the CD-Hadoop 
prototype, we describe the high-level functional requirements 
for the system and its information flow design. The CD-
Hadoop system must satisfy the following requirements: 
• Allow users to modify data only at their session level; 
• Allow users to observe data at their session level and at 
lower sensitivity levels; 
• Support a backward compatible HDFS API, to allow 
existing applications (which do not require read-down 
support) to run unmodified; 
• Defer MLS policy enforcement to the underlying 
trusted computing base (TCB); 
• Minimize the introduction of trusted processes, which 
would extend the TCB boundary. In particular, avoid a 
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B. Prototype Implementation 
The read-down mechanisms introduced in the CD-Hadoop 
prototype mostly impact the NameNode and DataNode logic 
and not the JobTracker and TaskTracker logic, as those 
components only interact with the NameNode and DataNode as 
HDFS clients. 
1) Changes to NameNode 
In its original design, whenever a change is made to the file 
system (e.g., when a directory is created), the NameNode 
daemon updates the fsImage and blockMap data structures that 
it uses for file system management. The fsImage database 
keeps track of the current file hierarchy, while the blockMap 
database records the DataNode where each block is stored. 
Both databases are kept in the NameNode’s private memory 
and are not visible to other NameNode instances.  
Our design introduces two additional data structures, the 
Cache-fsImage and the Cache-blockMap, to allow a high 
sensitivity NameNode instance to look up file metadata and 
block storage information associated with a file at a lower 
level. Each NameNode instance manages its own Cache-
fsImage and Cache-blockMap on the local RAM disk. For 
every write request, the NameNode instance servicing the 
request updates pertinent information in the fsImage and 
blockMap databases, and then copies the entire content of these 
databases to the Cache-fsImage and Cache-blockMap 
structures.  
Other NameNode instances consult the Cache-fsImage and 
Cache-blockMap structures to handle read-down requests, if 
their sensitivity levels strictly dominate the sensitivity levels of 
these objects. These other NameNodes use the file metadata 
obtained from the Cache-fsImage to check for file permission 
and block allocation, and the blocks-to-DataNodes mapping 
information from the Cache-blockMap to inform the requesting 
client where blocks are located. The client contacts surrogate 
DataNodes to perform the actual read-down data transfer. 
Concurrent access to the Cache-fsImage and Cache-
blockMap by different processes is synchronized using a lock-
free multiple-reader, single-writer integrity mechanism—a high 
reader gets a valid view of data at a lower level without using 
locks. Our read-and-retry data consistency mechanism has been 
designed so that no new covert channels are introduced. 
2) Changes to DataNode 
Each block is stored as two files—a block file and a 
metadata file—on either the local file system or a remote file 
system, e.g., an NFS volume. In its original design, the 
DataNode daemon maintains a blocks-to-files map to keep 
track of the file used to store each block on the local file 
system. Created during initialization, the volumeMap is 
updated at run-time whenever a new block is allocated to the 
DataNode or an existing block becomes inaccessible, e.g., the 
block is deleted or the file storing the block is corrupted.  
When a client asks to read an HDFS file at a lower level, 
the NameNode instance running at the client’s session level 
directs the client to contact the file’s surrogate DataNode, co-
located with the primary DataNode actually handling the file’s 
blocks. To return a requested block at a lower level, a surrogate 
DataNode instance must have access to the volumeMap 
maintained by the primary DataNode instance, to locate the 
(non-HDFS) files associated with the requested block. Since 
the volumeMap is kept in each DataNode’s private memory, a 
Cache-volumeMap is used to capture the content of the 
volumeMap on the system’s RAM disk, so that all surrogate 
DataNodes whose levels dominate that of the Cache-
volumeMap can read it while handling read-down requests.  
The DataNode instances use the same read-and-retry 
synchronization mechanism utilized by the NameNode to 
access the shared Cache-volumeMap.  
C. Implementation Discussion 
Given our objectives to minimize changes to the Hadoop 
code base and avoid introducing trusted processes, a number of 
design choices were made for the prototype implementation. 
1) Extended Block ID to Distinguish Levels 
To ensure uniqueness, the NameNode daemon generates a 
64-bit pseudo-random number (via the Java pseudo-random 
number generator) for the Block ID of each new block. In the 
CD-Hadoop prototype, the Block ID is extended to include the 
security label associated with the block, to partition the 
namespace across the Hadoop instances. The Extended Block 
ID includes a new 4-byte identifier (Level ID), describing the 
sensitivity level of each block. An alternative design is to 
introduce a new process to manage a pool of Block IDs for the 
entire cluster. In this alternative design, instead of generating 
the Block IDs, the NameNode would obtain them from the new 
process; however, adding a new process would complicate the 
overall design, and the additional inter-process communication 
may further decrease the performance of the NameNode. 
With a Level ID in the block identifier, the DataNode can 
determine independently whether to use its own volumeMap or 
a Cache-volumeMap at some lower level to look for the file 
data. Without the Level ID, the DataNode must search, with a 
consequent performance impact, its volumeMap and the Cache-
volumeMaps at all lower levels until the required data is found. 
2) Scalability across Sensitivity Levels 
Regarding block storage, the original HDFS design scales 
linearly, as DataNodes work independently and the number of 
DataNodes in a cluster can grow over time. The management 
of the file namespace and block information, however, 
introduces a performance bottleneck, since there is only one 
NameNode in the cluster and the NameNode keeps the fsImage 
and blockMap databases entirely in memory. In addition, the 
NameNode is also highly susceptible to resource exhaustion. 
The recently introduced HDFS Federation architecture [14] 
addresses NameNode scalability by keeping block information 
across multiple NameNodes. Although this approach partitions 
the Hadoop file system into multiple namespaces, the memory 
exhaustion problem still exists since the NameNode continues 
to keep the fsImage and blockMap databases in memory. 
In the MLS-enhanced environment, the memory exhaustion 
problem on the NameNode is exacerbated since there are 
multiple instances of the NameNode server process on a 
physical node, requiring additional memory for the Cache-
fsImage and Cache-blockMap structures. Using a separate 
 
physical node as a Cache Manager to maintain these databases 
may ameliorate this problem. With multiple single-level 
instances of the Cache Manager on the new node, one per 
sensitivity level, each Cache Manager instance would provide 
services that a NameNode instance at the same level could use 
to store and retrieve these databases.  
Using the sensitivity level of the receiving NIC as the 
requestor’s session level, the current prototype can only handle 
simple policies with a small number of sensitivity levels—a 
typical server platform can support up to 16 NICs. This limits 
the prototype’s ability to scale up to a larger number of levels. 
A more flexible system design such as the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA) could be leveraged to overcome this 
limitation. MYSEA supports an MLS LAN interface on which 
users can negotiate sessions at different levels [15][16]. Similar 
to MYSEA, using one MLS-NIC would allow the prototype to 
support more complex policies. 
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3) Implementation Complexity 
Source lines of code (SLOC) can be quickly calculated and 
thus is commonly used as an intuitive metric to estimate the 
complexity of software and development cost in terms of 
program size. The Count Lines of Code (CLOC) tool [17] was 
utilized to compare the SLOC of the original Hadoop HDFS 
code with the MLS-aware HDFS code (see Table 1). 
CLOC can calculate differences in blank, comment, and 
source lines in a given file, directory, or archive. The SLOC 
values shown in Table 1 summarize the number of source lines 
that were added, removed, modified or unchanged. The delta 
value is the sum of the addition, removal, and modification of 
source lines. The percent change value reflects the overall 
increase in the SLOC between the original and MLS-aware 
Hadoop, demonstrating that the prototype appears to meet our 
requirement to minimize changes to the existing software 
(under the assumption that <10% overall change is acceptable). 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section describes the performance of our MLS-aware 
Hadoop prototype on a virtualized test environment. 
A. Benchmark Configuration 
The test cluster consists of eleven nodes distributed across 
two racks. Each node in the cluster is a virtual machine (VM) 
hosted on VMware ESXi 5.0.0. Rack-1 contains three server 
blades (each, a Dell PowerEdge R710 system, with 8 CPUs x 
2.925 GHz with hyper-threading active, 48GB of memory and 
Gigabit Ethernet); Rack-2 contains a single server blade (a Dell 
PowerEdge R610 system, with 8 CPUS x 2.26 GHz with 
hyper-threading active, 24GB of memory and Gigabit 
Ethernet). The racks are connected with multi-port Gigabit 
Ethernet switches.  
The Hadoop distribution includes a number of performance 
benchmarking tools that run as MapReduce jobs. The following 
tools were used to gauge the performance of the current 
prototype: (a) NNBench, a NameNode stress test; (b) 
TestDFSIO, an HDFS I/O performance test that reads and 
writes files in parallel; and (c) TeraSort, a combination of three 
test applications designed to sort large amounts of data. 
Mahout’s Recommender example program [18] was used to 
measure performance, representing a real-world, popular 
MapReduce application. 
Each test scenario was run on both the original Hadoop and 
the CD-Hadoop. The JobTracker’s web interface was used to 
collect job statistics. The HDFS directory used by each test 
program was removed before starting each test case. 
B. Benchmark Results 
The NNBench program stresses the NameNode by creating 
zero-length files, thus forcing the NameNode to repeatedly 
update its databases. Under this test, the performance of our 
prototype degrades almost exponentially as the number of files 
increases. This performance behavior is caused by the overhead 
of caching the fsImage and blockMap every time a file is 
created/modified. Note that NNBench is designed to strain the 
NameNode with excessive file system operations with zero 
data, and is not representative of a normal load. 
The TestDFSIO program is designed to measure the I/O 
performance of HDFS in a normal context. The test consists of 
writing and reading three datasets of different sizes: 1GB, 
10GB and 20GB. The results indicate that for the 1GB and 
10GB test cases, the prototype performance is marginally 
slower for both read and write tests. However for the 20GB test 
case, the writing overhead is much higher while the reading 
overhead is slightly lower (but still within the margin of error). 
These write operations take longer because there are more 
blocks associated with the 20GB file, so it takes more time to 
flush the entire blockMap to the RAM disk.  
The TeraSort test suite was executed three times with 
different data sizes:  1GB, 10GB and 20GB. For each trial, its 
three test utilities are invoked in the same order: (TeraGen → 
TeraSort → TeraValidate). Without read-down operations, the 
TeraSort test results are roughly comparable to the performance 
of the original Hadoop. This indicates that the cost of accessing 
HDFS files has a minimal effect on the overall performance of 
a typical MapReduce job. However, the performance impact 
grows exponentially for read-down requests as the data size 
increases. The additional degradation was caused by the 
overhead of reading the cache databases, which the NameNode 
and DataNodes must do to handle a read-down request. 
The Mahout Recommender test scenario used a 1MB 
dataset obtained from GroupLens Research [19], which 
consisted of 1 million ratings of 4000 movies by 6000 users. 
This test consisted of running the Recommen
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